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Science and scientific knowledge have been questioned in many ways for a long period of time. Especially, after the scientific 
revolution of 16th- and 17th-century Europe1, science and its knowledge have been mainly accepted one of the most valuable 
and trustable information. However, in 20th century, autonomy of scientific knowledge and its dominant position over other 
kinds of knowledge have been mainly criticised. Social and other factors that were tried to be excluded before have been 
incorporated into the work by the influence of the Strong Programme. In this article, it will be argued that while people are 
presenting scientific knowledge, their interests, beliefs and the communities they are involved in are also shown to be effective 
in producing this information. Thus, the desired result is that it is not reasonable to talk about the absolute autonomy of 
scientific knowledge. 
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Öz 
Bilim ve bilimsel bilgi uzun yıllar boyunca bir çok açıdan sorgulanmıştır. Özellikle 16. ve 17. yüzyıl Avrupa'sının bilimsel 
devriminden sonra bilim ve onun bilgisi en güvenilir ve değerli bilgi kaynaklarından biri olarak kabul edilmiştir. Ancak, 20 yy. da 
bilimsel bilginin özerkliği ve bu bilginin diğer bilgi türleri üzerindeki baskın durumu genellikle tartışılmaya başlanmıştır. Güçlü 
Programın etkisi ile daha önce dışarıda bırakılmaya çalışılan sosyal ve diğer faktörler işin içine dahil olmaya başlamıştır. Bu 
makalede, insanların bilimsel bilgiyi üretirken, çıkarlarının, inançlarının ve bağlı bulundukları toplulukların bu bilginin 
üretilmesinde etkili olduğu tartışılmaktadır. Böylece, arzulanan sonuç, bilimsel bilginin mutlak özerkliği hakkında konuşmanın 
mantıklı olmayacağıdır. 




Throughout history, science has been evaluated as the primary and most reliable source of knowledge 
amongst scientists, philosophers and sociologists (Pigliucci, 2008) and it has been considered cognitive 
and an autonomous activity that provides objective knowledge of the world. Furthermore, science has 
been generally recognized superior to the other kinds of social and cultural factors (Chalmers, 1999). 
Due to these reasons, even though sociologists such as Weber, Marx, and Comte agreed that 
sociology examines social factors like religion, myth, ideology excluding science, they all claimed that 
the only possible way to achieve objective knowledge is to adopt scientific methods (Chalmers, 
1999).2   
Nowadays, scientism (the idea that keeping science superior above everything with the autonomy of 
scientific knowledge) maintains its effect among various groups’ thought, but it can be said that it has 
lost its former dominant position. There are several reasons shred public confidence in scientism: the 
                                                          
1 Hendrix, S. E. (2011). 
2 A similar attitude can be seen in the philosophy of science; those social factors does not fall into the range of science because 
it is evaluated apart from external factors. Particularly, this scientist viewpoint can be seen in the Vienna Circle with their logical 
positivist ideas (Uebel, 2012).    
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'linguistic turn' studies in the philosophy of language; new Marxist sociology schools which bring 
criticism on existing sociological ideologies; and relativist ideas that occur in the area of philosophy. 
These elements have led to the discussion of the epistemic autonomy. As a matter of fact, the idea of 
epistemic autonomy has been criticized throughout the history by thoughts of sophists, sceptics, 
subjective idealists and social constructionists. Theoretical framework behind this opposition is mainly 
relativism (Sober, 2008).3  
In this essay, the main interest will be given to the discussion of sociology and autonomy of scientific 
knowledge and its situation against relativism and social constructivism approaches. In this regard, 
firstly, Strong Programme’s principles and David Bloor's ideas about relativism, which is a featured 
representative of the Strong Programme will be explained.  Secondly, analysis of another interesting 
aspect of the school’s programme – its epistemological position – will be given with concepts about 
the notion of truth due to their epistemological viewpoint and cognitive tools. Finally, my advocation 
on Bloor’s stance which criticizes scientific autonomy and my opinions will be presented. 
2. Strong Programme 
The idea that keeping science superior above anything else and the autonomy of scientific knowledge 
was mainly criticized by the Strong Programme in the field of sociology of science with its relativist 
and social constructivist opinion after 1950 (Barnes, 1985). Scientific knowledge has not been treated 
as a privilege over religion, magic and myths (distinct from what it was evaluated as before 1950). In 
other words, it has lost its privileged position among others (Barnes, 1995). According to this new 
movement, science is not the most objective and rational form among other forms of knowledge 
because there are no unequivocal rules assisting scholars to reach the ultimate objective and reliable 
information (Bloor, 1991). Hence, sociologists of science who argue the Strong Programme’s 
standpoint are engaged in how the science is affected by the social process, which means the belief 
and scientific knowledge are assessed with cultural factors and seen as social institutions.4 
Edinburg school was one of the famous social constructivist schools that strengthened this criticism 
against the scientism (Jasanoff, Markle, Pinch and Petersen, 2002). Academics in this community were 
using the “notion of interest” in order to analyse scientific activities.  Information allegations that are 
emerged from these scholars are usually social and these claims reflect the political interests of their 
knowledge and understandings. That is why; their approaches could be regarded as the interest 
approach which effects scholars’ statements and beliefs (Jasanoff, Markle, Pinch and Petersen, 2002).  
As can be seen, Strong Programme is generally known as the Interests Approach under the general 
heading of social constructionism (Jasanoff, Markle, Pinch and Petersen, 2002). The general claim of 
the Strong Programme is that scientific knowledge should be treated by sociological analyses. The 
conclusions of this analysis are the following propositions: 
• Any knowledge claim faced in scientific debates is not more rational than other claims. 
• None of the truth value of scientific propositions is entirely unknown (Jasanoff, Markle, Pinch 
and Petersen, 2002). 
As illustrated by these two propositions, social interest plays an important role in the construction of 
knowledge claims. Also it describes the definition of scientific knowledge, which means the purpose of 
                                                          
3 Explaining the relativism with its variants such as cognitive and conceptual relativism will be useful for us in order to 
understand the topic in detail. Cognitive relativism comes up with the belief that there are no objective truths but only local 
beliefs and conceptual relativism is the view that different groups (e.g., those with very different languages or cultures) may 
have rather different central concepts and this can lead their members to rather different conceptions of the world (Sokal and 
Bricmont, 2002). 
4 Besides, in the mid of the 70’s, although Merton saw the science as a social institution, he was criticized by social 
constructionists because he accepted the objectivity of science and its superiority than other knowledge structures (Jasanoff, 
Markle, Pinch & Petersen, 2002). 
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Strong Programme is to understand ideas that is accepted as true and their conditions that appeared 
(Webster, 1991). 
At the beginning of the sociology of scientific knowledge, only unsuccessful scientific theories are 
evaluated as the products of the social influences in order to understand which social factors led to 
failure of scientific method. However, Strong Programme takes into account all scientific theories, 
activities and knowledge as a result of social structures and elements without any distinction. From 
this point of view, each cognitive or knowing activity emerges from society, even if it is successful or 
not.  For this reason, the decisive relation between social factors and community of scientist is not an 
outer and separate factor, but rather the intrinsic nature of this relationship is an essential element of 
science (Bloor, 1991).  
Likewise, representatives of the Strong Programme claim that we cannot understand the knowledge 
only with two cognitive tools (mind and senses) because social factors not only provide knowledge but 
also shape cognitive tools at the same time (Jasanoff, Markle, Pinch and Petersen, 2002). That is why, 
in this situation, social factors are important in the information producing process. 
Bloor (1991) elaborates the topic in his “Knowledge and Social Imagery” book with his epistemological 
point of view. He focuses on the distribution of beliefs and factors influencing them. He asks some 
questions in order to understand and elaborate the issue. For instance, “how is knowledge 
transmitted; how stable is it; what processes go into its creation and maintenance; how is it organised 
and categorised into different disciplines or spheres? (Bloor, 1991, pp.5)” 
According to Bloor (1991), in order to understand knowledge getting process in detail, examination 
and clarification are necessary for sociologists , since they will effort to characterise knowledge in a 
way which accords with this viewpoint. That is why; their opinions will be in the same causal idiom as 
those of any other scientist. Their concern will be to locate the regularities and general principles or 
processes which appear to be at work within the field of their data. The purpose will be to set theories 
to explain these regularities. They will have to apply true and false beliefs together, if these theories 
are to fulfil the necessity of greatest generality, and as much as possible the same kind of clarification 
will have to use in both situations. He presents an analogy in order to demonstrate the topic: 
The aim of physiology is to explain the organism in health and disease; the aim of mechanics is to 
understand machines which work and machines which fail; bridges which stand as well as those which fall. 
Similarly, the sociologist seeks theories which explain the beliefs which are in fact found, regardless of how 
the investigator evaluates them (Bloor, 1991, pp. 5).  
From the analysis above, the main tendency of the strong programme is to be sure that these theories 
implemented to all beliefs whether true or false. Sociology of knowledge tries to understand scientific 
activities with the four principles of this movement shaped by the main tendency (Bloor, 1991). These 
four tenets are as below respectively; 
1. It would be causal: that is, concerned with the conditions which bring about belief or states of 
knowledge. Naturally there will be other types of causes apart from social ones which will cooperate in 
bringing about belief. 
2. It would be impartial with respect to truth and falsity, rationality or irrationality, success or failure. Both 
sides of these dichotomies will require explanation. 
3. It would be symmetrical in its style of explanation. The same types of cause would explain say, true 
and false beliefs. 
4. It would be reflexive. In principle its patterns of explanation would have to be applicable to sociology 
itself. Like the requirement of symmetry this is a response to the need to seek for general 
explanations. It is an obvious requirement of principle because otherwise sociology would be a 
standing refutation of its own theories  (Bloor, 1991, pp. 7). 
The strong programme can be identified through these four principles as illustrated above: causality, 
impartiality, symmetry and reflexivity. As we can see, the first principle demands sociological and  
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psychological conditions, which indicates non-scientific determinants when we need to examine the 
statements of beliefs or knowledge. Bloor (1991) states that science is not created in a vacuum, but, 
he realises that science does not merely occur with social effects. In addition, explaining the causes of 
beliefs as true or false is prohibited by the second principle because all beliefs need to be explained 
whether they are true or not. The principle of symmetry is the variation of the principle of impartiality. 
The same types of explanations are used for successful and unsuccessful knowledge claims alike. For 
instance, communist ideologues in the Soviet Union preferred Lamarckian theory of evolution rather 
than the Darwinian evolution. The reason behind of this is the same to confirm one and refuse the 
other one. While Lamarck’s theory of evolution was fit to Hegel's view of history based on his Geist, 
Darwin’s theory of evolution was not. Finally, according to fourth principle, it must be applicable to 
sociology itself. In another sense, when sociologists claim that there is a political interest behind 
scientific claim, they are also aware that their claims also include political interest. 
 
3. Strong Programme and its Epistemological Position 
Another important point is that the sociologist deals with the knowledge, containing scientific 
knowledge, solely as a natural phenomenon is claimed by Bloor (1991). Hence, the proper description 
of knowledge will be quite different from that of either the lay person or the philosopher. Rather than 
describing it as true belief, knowledge for the sociologist is anything that is considered as information 
by people. It comprises of those beliefs which people surely hold to and live by. Especially, the 
sociologist will be concerned with beliefs which are taken for granted or institutionalised, or invested 
with authority by groups of people. According to him (1991), separating the knowledge from mere 
belief is necessity. This can be done by reserving the word 'knowledge' for what is collectively 
endorsed, leaving the individual and idiosyncratic to count as mere belief. 
In addition, Bloor (1991) states that what is said here for general knowledge also can be said for 
scientific knowledge. Therefore, Strong Programme’s tenets were sent forward as a result of such an 
adaptation. These principles made also controversial informational autonomy claim mentioned in the 
definition of traditional knowledge. Such autonomy is based on the terms 'justification’ and 
'righteousness'. Strong Programme argues (Jasanoff, Markle, Pinch and Petersen, 2002) that both 
terms are not autonomous from society; conversely they are determined by society. It can be said that 
claiming the autonomy of knowledge is not possible from Bloor’s side.   
For this reason, Bloor also criticizes the traditional epistemological point of view, because while it is 
explaining scientific activities, it does not consider social factors. He claims (1991) that traditional 
epistemology only uses sociology and psychology in order to clarify false beliefs. However, there is a 
conflict between Bloor's principles of method and traditional methods - claiming the creation of 
knowledge has some internal / autonomous elements. According to Bloor (1991), we need to examine 
this situation and try to decide which theory is right. In order to understand the doctrine of his Strong 
Programme, epistemological position of the principles behind the proposed method should be checked 
(Bloor, 1991). This position is hidden in Bloor's answer to the question of what makes people do the 
right thing or rational?  He says (1991) that classifying the beliefs as the right or the rational is based 
on teleological or goal-directed understanding of information. While teleological epistemology is 
explaining the nature of causal problems, it uses some concepts that we encounter in society. For this 
reason, our cognitive process or knowing behaviour is social and it has two inevitable results (Bloor, 
1991).   
1. Truth is a concept that has three basic functions 
2. Theory of righteousness called correspondence theory is incorrect (Bloor, 1991). 
These two results can be further examined in detail: 
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Bloor mentions the function of the traditional concept of truth. According to him (1991), our idea of 
truth does a number of tasks which are worth noting if only to demonstrate that they are suitable with 
the strong programme and the pragmatic and instrumental idea of correspondence which has 
emerged in the discussion. 
He claims (1991) the first task is that discriminatory function. Men are under the necessity to order 
and sort their beliefs. They must distinguish those which work for them from those which do not. True 
and false are the labels typically used and are as good as any, although explicitly pragmatic vocabulary 
would function just as well. 
Second one is the rhetorical function. These labels take a place in an argument, criticism and 
persuasion. He states that there would be no problem about what to believe, if our knowledge were 
purely under the control of stimulation from the physical world. However, adapting to the world 
mechanically for us is not possible due to the social element in our knowledge. For this reason, this 
conventional and theoretical instrument introduces a continuing problem of maintenance. According to 
Bloor (1991), the language of truth is closely related with the problem of cognitive order. On the one 
hand, human generally talk of truth so that they might suggest this or that certain claim. On the other 
hand, truth is invoked accurately as an idea of something possibly dissimilar from any received 
opinion.  
It is thought of as something that transcends mere belief. It has this form because it is our way of putting a 
question mark against whatever we wish to doubt or change or consolidate. Of course, when men affirm 
truth or detect and denounce error, there is no need for them to have privileged access or ultimate insight 
into these things. The language of truth has never needed this. It was as available, and as legitimately 
available to Priestley with his phlogiston theory, as it is to us (Bloor, 1991, pp. 41). 
This is all very similar to the discriminatory function except that now the labels can be seen taking on 
overtones of transcendence and authority. Man can identify the nature of the authority instantly. Any 
particular theoretical view of the world has authority, this can only derive from the actions and 
opinions of men. Authority is evaluated as a social category by Bloor (1991) and he thinks that only 
human being can use it. They endeavour to transmit it to their settled opinions and assumptions. 
Nature has power over us, but only men have authority. In some measure, the transcendence 
associated with truth will have the same social source, but it also points to the third function of the 
notion of truth. 
It is the materialist function. According to Bloor (1991), “All our thinking instinctively assumes that we 
exist within a common external environment that has a determinate structure. The precise degree of 
its stability is not known, but it is stable enough for many practical purposes (Bloor, 1991, pp. 41).” 
Opinions vary about its responsiveness to our thoughts and actions, but in practice the existence of an 
external world-order is never doubted. It is assumed to be the cause of our experience, and the 
common reference of our discourse. He shall lump all this under the name of materialism. Often when 
we use the word truth' we mean just this: how the world stands. By this word, we convey and affirm 
this ultimate schema with which we think. Of course this schema is filled out in many different ways. 
This schema may differ from culture to culture because such a schema is the material/common core 
of people, objects and natural process. 
The second result of the claim of sociality of cognitive process is that the theory of correspondence is 
wrong (Bloor, 1991). Essentially, effect of materialist function of the concept of truth can be seen 
behind the theory of accuracy, because this theory cannot be introduced without accepting the idea 
that there is an external world outside of the mind. Bloor (1991) suggests that theory of accuracy, 
especially faced in experimental science, should be rejected and conventional understanding of truth 
should be adopted. Further, scientific theories and procedures must be consonant with other 
conventions and purposes prevalent in a social group. According to Bloor (1991), the relation of 
correspondence between a theory and reality is unclear. For this reason, this ambiguity cannot be 
ignored in terms of epistemology.  
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In this situation, Bloor gives an example from the history of chemistry in order to make the issue 
tangible. He takes Priestley's analyses about phlogiston theory, proceeds from this theory, the 
situation of the correspondence in reality, indeed, only is rhetoric, which means it depends on our 
interpretation. He said that 
the process of scientific thought can all proceed and have to proceed on the basis of internal principles of 
assessment. They are moved by the perception of error as it crops up within the terms of our theories, 
purposes, interest, problems and standards (Bloor, 1991, pp.40). In this instance, there is no objection to 
argue that our theories are simply “conventional instruments” for coping with our environment (Bloor, 1991, 
pp. 40). 
As can be seen from these statements in terms of Strong Programme, ultimately all scientific theories, 
methods, and the results consist of social conventions (Bloor, 1991). To put it another way, concepts 
such as "objectivity", "truth", "rationality", "justification", "convention", "object", "nature" and of 
course "society" are nearly being redefined. For example, Bloor claims that the concept of “truth” in 
many contexts can be replaced with "the concept of prefer". 
As outlined above, the following theses create the core of The Strong Programme's epistemological 
claims; 
1) There is no a universal cognitive background that informational judgments founded on it. 
These judgments are the product of different collective structures and cultures; also each 
structure constitutes its own judgements. 
2) Therefore, while people are performing the action to know something, they also reflect their 
own thought and beliefs on it and evaluate them with these beliefs.  
3) They (especially Barnes) emphasized that the effects of the world (society) on the subject is 
always and in every case shaped by the cognitive / linguistic models. 
4) As well as the emphasis on social factors insisting that the information is not generated by 
individuals. 
These theses provide us to draw epistemological limits of the Strong Programme. Due to the variable 
bond between sociality and language, especially Barnes, suggested that our structure of verbal 
knowledge does not represent the reality under a single form. According to him, this is an inevitable 
feature of our linguistic and cognitive capacities (Harré and Krausz, 1998, pp.102). 
3. Conclusion 
To conclude, it is the autonomy of scientific knowledge has been questioned. As can be seen, keeping 
science superior to other kinds of knowledge such as sociology has been criticised especially by Strong 
Programme’s doctrines. Science and scientific knowledge are always seen as autonomous and it is 
thought that they are not affected by social factors. Bloor shows that the notion of interest takes an 
important place while producing scientific knowledge. For this reason, accepting the advantages of 
scientific knowledge over religion, magic and myths will not be reasonable, because it cannot be said 
that any knowledge claim is more rational than other scientific claims in scientific debates. Finally, 
scientific activities are tried to be understood in terms of four principles of Strong Programme; 
causality, impartiality, symmetry and reflexivity.  
Finally, traditional epistemological point of view has been taken into account to show that it did not 
consider social factors while clarifying scientific activities. All scientific theories, methods and the 
results consist of social agreements at last, according to Strong Programme. That is why, the notion of 
truth can be altered with the concept of preference because people attach their ideas and beliefs  
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while they are trying to know and create scientific knowledge. As a result, Strong Programme and its 
representatives – especially Bloor – shows that autonomy of scientific knowledge is not the idea that 
we can adopt since the knowledge is influenced by social factors and interests. 
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